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Familiar legal theories are epistemologically and politically stato-centric theories; 
they aim to rationalize intra- and inter-national legal systems. If this Westphalian 
approach were abandoned, then its replacement might be called Global Law, 
which invites theorizing that is not stato-centric. When that change happens, one 
would talk about a Global Turn in legal theory.
 Describing this turn is the aim of the present paper. To this end I am going to 
present two ideas and three intuitions—not to mention a couple of ambiguities. 
The two ideas concern the history and the geography of Global Law. The three 
intuitions are about the fate of legal theory itself in this new emerging context. 
What follows is neither a substantial or positivistic analysis, nor a prediction or 
a wish. I point out tendencies, things that are happening more and more. 
What is Global Law?
The term “Global Law” is a catchall term the definition of which varies consider-
ably depending on the author who uses it and the context in which it is used; it 
was exactly the same for the term “State” before its scientific rationalization was 
attempted. This flexibility is precisely the reason why its various uses should be 
taken seriously. Global Law, as both a scientific object and a new paradigm, is 
a process of solidifying the notion as an explicative and unifying mixture of a 
large number of disparate legal phenomena. The notion may be confusing simply 
because it designates heterogeneous legal phenomena. 
 The term has been stigmatized to such an extent that William Twining wise-
ly prohibited his students at the University of London in his “Globalization and 
Law” class from using the “g word”.1 It is not shameful, however, to presume 
that legal regimes and organizations whose scope or field is supra- or trans-na-
tional can be characterized as global. In this sense, “global” means worldwide 
but “Global Law” does not designate an independent legal order that is schem-
ing outside of the existing legal orders. It is not a Worldwide Law, but rather 
the emergence of supra- and trans-national legal phenomena so inextricably 
tied to a dense network of legal relations that the different levels of the “sub-
global” cannot be analyzed independently of one another. In what follows, the 
term “Global Law” will refer to this definition.
A French version of this article was published in www.juspoliticum.com. I would like to thank the 
editors for permitting the English publication. Thanks to Olivier Jouanjan and Eric Maulin for their 
wonderful hospitality during the colloquium where the paper was discussed, as well as Louis Assier 
Andrieu, Frédéric Audren, Denis Baranger, Benoit Frydman, Christophe Jamin, Duncan Kennedy, 
and Horatia Muir Watt for their insights and comments on previous versions. Thanks also to Christian 
Yoder for his great help on the English translation and to Andrew Lang for his kind advice.
 1. William Twining, General Jurisprudence, Understanding Law from a Global Perspective 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) at 14-15.
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First Idea. A Succinct History of Global Law 
Accounts of the genesis of Global Law are innumerable. Here is the one I 
would prefer. 
 Global Law is the result of a historical process of the worldwide generaliza-
tion of western legalism, the triumph of civilization understood as the Empire of 
the Civil Law. (At this level of general discussion, when we speak of civilization, 
of westernization, of modernization, or still yet of legalization, we are more or 
less talking about the same thing.)
 This process is that by which non-western societies were commanded to adopt 
rules, procedures, institutions, categories, and modes of legal reasoning to the point 
of reconfiguring their individual and collective identities by varying degrees in the 
terms and ways of western legalism, in any of its different versions (Common Law, 
Civil Law, etc.). To enter into the “concert of civilized nations”, certain imperatives 
had to be obeyed and certain conditions or principles had to be satisfied. These 
processes are now starting to be well studied and better understood. 
 An independent legal system had to be put in place that guarantees the dignity 
of the individual, the individual’s property, liberty to contract, an independent 
administrative system that organized the fundamental functions of society and as-
sured basic diplomatic rules, and finally the eradication of certain practices judged 
as barbaric (polygamy, suttee, etc.).2 The protocols to implement these principles 
vary according to the situation. Some made the distinction between “coloniza-
tion” and “opening”. With colonization, a “civilized nation” would impose west-
ern legalism on a “nation to civilize”. This would be done either directly (the 
French way) or indirectly (the British way) or any possible nuance between the 
two. In the “opening”, the “nation to civilize” would be constrained by the “civi-
lizing nation” by means of adopting western legalism (Japan, Turkey, etc.).
 Beyond the variety of implementation protocols, one can sketch a general out-
line of the modus operandi that governs these processes that follow the scholarly 
distinctions between barbarians, savages, and the civilized.
 The barbarian is recognized by the fact that he disposes of something that 
already resembles written Law (The Laws of Manu, Islamic Law, Criminal 
Statutes in China, Tokugawa Laws in Japan, etc.). He is distinguished from the 
savage, who does not possess anything intelligible that could possibly resemble 
Law (the famous “societies without history”). For the savage, laws must be cre-
ated from scratch and given to him. The civilizer will start thus by distinguishing 
the indigenous uses and practices that are worthy of being part of civilization 
(albeit through transformation) from those that are too primitive to be included 
in a civilized legal system. The elements that are worth being kept will then 
be translated into the vocabulary and grammar of Western legalism under the 
term “customary laws” (which has since become “indigenous laws”, although no 
 2. See Gerrit Gong, The Standard of “Civilization” in International Society (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1984). The question is asked whether those conditions were really the ones explicitly 
required, or if there was something else necessary, as Japan believed to have discovered the 
condition of being itself a “civilizer” after 1895.
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substantial changes have occurred in its operation).3 Finally, the civilizer assigns 
these laws to their secondary, auxiliary, and derogatory role within the legal sub-
order that he is building as a complement of the rules and institutions that are pre-
sumed universal such as the rules of Patrimonial Law (property, contracts) and 
of Public Law (sovereignty, separation of powers, more recently human rights, 
free elections). Family Law has been designated at least since Savigny as being 
more open to the manners and the spirit of the people than Patrimonial Law, and 
has become, under the covert accommodation and recognition of “cultural dif-
ferences”, the front line and the preferred place of intense negotiations between 
the Universal Law of the civilizer and the so-called traditions of the civilized (the 
latter generally having been invented ad hoc during these negotiations, to the 
largest benefit of the local, dominant elites).4
 The inhabitants of the civilized nations, whose superior culture is many centu-
ries old, are lucky enough to have not experienced these kinds of collapses. Any 
trauma that they had suffered has been inflicted by themselves through religious 
struggles, civil wars, and other revolutions. This is perhaps why it is difficult for 
them to experience the tremendous symbolic violence suffered by these societ-
ies now required to express and understand themselves in the syntax and the 
terms of a so-far unknown language. It was a constraint interiorized little by 
little, eventually ending up as legitimate (because it was “modern”). They be-
came more and more incapable of expressing and thinking of themselves “like 
before”, feeling that they were obliged to invent a new “before” (because no 
one could reasonably and decently have no “before” and also because it is use-
ful to have a bargaining chip for the negotiating terms of submitting to the new 
civilized order). They had to experience both the humiliation of submission and 
the pride of attaining access to the highly enviable symbolic universe of the New 
Masters. They were obliged to inhabit these new forms of hybrid identities that 
were both intensely loved and hated, but still fatally flawed and insecure and that 
only arduously emerge from this chaos.5
 These times were those, furious and heroic, of the world of before the post, 
viz., in Westphalia. Westphalia is ordinarily presented as a world structured by 
the binomial National States/inter-state International Law. This is not an un-
truth, but it must be added that this structural division has been reproduced in 
the form of a chiasmus within each binomial term.6 The sovereignty of States 
 3. When anthropologists invented customary laws, they had the excuse of not having read the 
critical works of legal anthropology that had been published since. See Louis Assier-Andrieu, 
Le droit dans les sociétés humaines (Paris: Nathan, 1996). Gunther Teubner & Andreas 
Fischer-Lescano, “Cannibalizing Epistemes: Will Modern Law Protect Traditional Cultural 
Expressions?” in Christoph Beat Graber & Mira Burri-Nenova, eds, Intellectual Property and 
Traditional Cultural Expressions: Legal Protection in a Digital Environment (Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar, 2008) at 17-45. 
 4. See Duncan Kennedy, “Savigny’s Family/Patrimony Distinction and its Place in the Global 
Genealogy of Classical Legal Thought” (2010) 58 Am J Comp L 811.
 5. In a mass of literature, see Franz Fanon, Peaux noires, masques blancs (Paris: Seuil, 1952) or 
in another genre, ironic, subtle and hopeless, see Junichirô Tanizaki, “L’éloge de l’ombre” in 
Œuvres (Gallimard: Pleiade, 1997) at vol 1.
 6. Duncan Kennedy uses the expression “nesting” to describe the phenomenon of reproduction of 
binary divisions within each of the terms of divisions. See Duncan Kennedy, “The Semiotics 
of Legal Argument” (1991) 42 Syracuse L Rev 75.
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can be divided between internal and external. International Law can be divided 
between Inter-State Law that links civilized nations to each other (International 
Public Law) and the unnamed mesh of legal relationships—colonies, protec-
torates, unequal treaties, etc.—that link the civilized nations to the nations to 
civilize. Within International Public Law, the subjects are free (sovereign) and 
equal States, unified by formally universal and comparable legal relations that 
are also reversible. On the other hand, the unnamed civilizing mesh legalizes the 
inequality of power through the unilateral domination by sovereign states of non-
states, partial-states, and those states that are presumed incapable of governing 
themselves. Between International Public Law and the unnamed civilizing mesh 
there exists a mirror relationship, a relationship where the desired fate of the un-
named mesh is to be reabsorbed into International Public Law once the civilizing 
mission which civilized nations assign to themselves is completed. 
 This is what occurred with the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights in 1948, which marks the achievement of humanity as one civilization. 
Now, every human being is a dignified and capable legal “person” who is granted 
fundamental rights. Every human group (at least formally) is a State or part of a 
State and is governed by a constitution. Western legalism has imposed itself as the 
language of a generally uniform cursory anthropology through which it is never-
theless very easy to perceive the non-western “historical worlds”, or at least what 
they became through the process of “civilizing” them.
 Nevertheless, one should not rush to declare western legalism as being the 
last horizon of the History of Humanity. Neither should it be said that we are 
observing the End of History, as civilizations might have a tendency to be stub-
born. In this new order, however, the internal chiasmatic or intersecting structure 
of Westphalian International Law has collapsed. The concept of “International 
Public Law” has lost its counterpart: the unnamed civilizing mesh that was its 
dark side. By losing its dark side, International Public Law also lost its function 
as a model, as there was officially nothing more to model. The historical dynamic 
that carried it until now has concluded.7 For the sake of convenience, one may 
label what follows as “Global Law”. However, the least we can say is that what 
follows is certainly not very clear. Here are two ambiguities. 
Ambiguity 1: Global Law and Globalized Capitalism
Global Law is often associated with the promotion of universal human dignity, 
property, and the freedom to contract. It is also associated with the uniformiza-
tion of the world through the diffusion of the Common Law, the standardization 
of legal practices by large transnational law firms (model contracts, etc.), to the 
phenomenon of forum shopping, to the recourse to private justice (arbitration, 
conciliation, mediation) in international commercial relationships, and to the 
production of legal rules by the private actors themselves. In the same vein, 
 7. See Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International 
Law 1870-1960 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
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Global Law would herald the triumph of commercial interests and/or of the man-
agerial vision of the world and/or of the legal structure of globalized capitalism 
and/or of liberalism and/or of the Empire. Some would rejoice at this prospect 
because they consider that the advent of Global Law is likely to create a kind of 
impending radiant future for humanity, one that is characterized by open markets 
that ensure (sustainable) development and (environmentally-friendly) prosperity. 
Commerce would civilize manners; offer everyone the benefits of peace, human 
rights, representative democracy, and moderate government. Others are unhappy 
with the phenomenon, as they associate Global Law with the explosion of in-
equalities, the systematic pillaging of natural resources, environmental catastro-
phes, the crumbling of the State, its social policies and democratic institutions, 
the aggressive and arrogant expansion of Western civilization, the standardiza-
tion of culture, and endless wars.
 Global Law has undeniably a lot to do with all that. The dominant strands 
within Global Law are certainly tied to those of transnational businesses. The 
hegemonic projects which are expressed within Global Law are generally very 
imperial in nature. The ideologies that saturate it are certainly not foreign to eco-
nomic liberalism and managerial ways of governing. Still, Global Law is about 
certain systems, procedures, and legal arguments which, like all systems, proce-
dures, and legal arguments, are governed in large part by a logic of their own that 
cannot be reduced to the interests, projects, and ideologies that are invested in 
it at one given moment. Global Law designates an ocean of practices and legal 
forms that are too complex to be considered as a single block, too contradictory, 
too full of metaphysical subtleties, too open to a multiplicity of heterogeneous 
interests, projects, values, and ideologies.
 Global Law cannot be easily reduced to the legal institution of globalized 
capitalism because it does not simply institutionalize global markets and trans-
national firms. Since the invention of international litigation of human rights, 
Total’s liability for the atrocities committed by the Burmese army in connection 
with the construction of a gas pipeline could have provoked a suit elsewhere 
than in front of an unsympathetic Burmese court, and there is no indication that 
this evolution has in any way benefited the firm in question.8 The term “Global 
Law” also means the possible convergence, on a worldwide scale, of categories 
and administrative practices that certain parties hope will strengthen the State’s 
capacity for action.9 Islamic Law is globalizing. In certain ways, it presents itself 
as a cultural alternative to globalized capitalism (and in some ways, it is in per-
fect sync with it). The inter-civilizational approach to human rights is a radical 
critique of Euro-centrist biases and of the managerial approach to the Global 
 8. On this case, see Benoît Frydman, “Total et ses enjeux” in Liber Amicorum Paul Martens: 
L’humanisme dans la Résolution des Conflits. Utopie ou Réalité ? (Bruxelles: Larcier, 2007) 
at 301-21. 
 9. See Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch, & Richard B Stewart, “The Emergence of Global 
Administrative Law” (2005) 68 Law & Contemp Prob 15. See also Sabino Cassese, 
“Administrative Law without the State? The Challenge of Global Regulation” (2005) 37 
NYUJ Int’l L & Pol 663. For a critique of this project, see Bhupinder Singh Chimni, “Co-
Option and Resistance: Two Faces of Global Administrative Law” (2005) 37NYUJ Int’l L & 
Pol 799.
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Law of human rights.10 The TWAIL (Third World Approaches in International 
Law) projects welcome analyses that are very openly and very radically anti-
capitalist.11 These projects are not any less legal and no less global than the object 
of their critique. Everything is globalizing, not only the institutions of global 
capitalism but also its critics. If we do not see that the practical and legal forms 
designated by the term “Global Law” play a role in the institution of global 
capitalism, then we miss both the trees and the forest. But by entirely reducing 
Global Law to the institutions of globalized capitalism, we deprive ourselves of 
the opportunity to understand and work out its contradictions.
Ambiguity 2: Global Law and the Obsolescence of the States
The second ambiguity is related to the role of the States in the development of 
Global Law. We often associate, in France at least, Global Law with the loss of 
State influence. Global Law obviously includes a strong supra- or trans-national 
dimension, not only in the sense that it is deployed on a worldwide scale, but also 
in the sense that it takes place independently and outside of the State. Some right-
ly talked about Non-State Law. It is rare, however, that we manage to identify 
legal phenomena that are clearly independent of national legal orders. Most com-
mon examples are forms and practices that do not have their origin in the State, 
in which the role of the State is transformed, but the State does not disappear. 
From the perspective of Global Tax Law, which is a product of the competition 
among national Tax Law regimes (Law shopping), the sovereignty of the State 
can be a source of Law and political authority, a complex network of tax regimes 
and inter-state conventions, and possibly a valuable commodity. International 
Criminal Law causes the emergence of the “States of Justice” (those States that 
declare themselves as having universal jurisdiction), States that don’t play the 
game (those States that have not signed international treaties), and even—a new-
er entity in the history of Law—“Criminal States”. The Lex Sportiva is the prod-
uct of a complex game of actors including regional and international federations, 
private actors (sponsors, the media), but also States, which intervene as States, 
and also through their own national federations or via regional and international 
federations and private actors (to which they often have very strong ties). These 
phenomena don’t lead to the “death of the State”, but rather to its integration in 
a deep and radically changed legal context that puts their prerogatives into per-
spectives while, at the same time, offering it new mechanisms of action. 
 All this is rather new. The cartographer of the world before the “post”—be-
fore Global Law—was Thomas Hobbes. The planet was a vast jungle (“State 
of Nature” in philosophical terms) whence emerged various oases (the national 
 10. See Yasuaki Onuma, A Transcivilizational Perspective on International Law (Leiden/Boston: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 2010).
 11. See Bhupinder Chimni, James Gathii, Celestine Nyamu, Vasuki Nesiah, Elchee Noworjee & 
Hani Sayed, TWAIL, Vision Statement, working paper, 1997. This text is available in James 
Thuo Gathii’s “Alternative and Critical. The Contribution of Research and Scholarship on 
Developing Countries to International Legal Theory” (2000) 41 Int’l LJ at 263-75. 
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legal orders) that were tied together by customs, treaties, and a little bit of jus 
gentium (to the extent that they consented to be tied). From time to time, a 
State would attempt to become the Dominus Mundi and would inevitably fail. 
“Sovereignty” was the term that designated the unbridled and absolute liberty (at 
least by the Law) that was accorded to each State in relation to the other States. 
These States ended up grouped together at the Center of the World, or in other 
words, in the West. In this great jungle, we had also discovered (starting in 1492) 
bizarre entities (societies, nations, tribes, clans, etc.) that have since been linked 
to civilized States by an unnamed mesh of legal relations that were forced upon 
them (colonies, protectorates, unequal treaties, etc.). Starting from the second 
half of the 20th century, the landscape changes by becoming more complex. 
 There are still States (there are even more since the bizarre entities are now all 
presumably States, at least on paper), but these States are now integrated into a 
dense network of diverse legal obligations, weaved together by a myriad of enti-
ties that have authorized themselves to produce Law.12 Judges have given them-
selves universal jurisdiction. Others (or the same) have elevated the decisions of 
their foreign colleagues as a source of Law in matters of domestic Law. Private 
international arbitrators created considerable bodies of Law that they began to 
codify. International organizations—including athletic associations, humanitar-
ian associations, transnational corporations, religious institutions, and universi-
ties—produced rules and standards that are meant to be respected.13
 If we want to continue with the naturalist metaphor, we can say that the mesh 
of legal regimes has become dense enough to form something like a complex and 
moving environment that now constitutes the ecosystem in which recently and 
formerly civilized States are now obliged to operate. The world is no longer a 
virgin forest in which we perceive several independent national legal orders, but 
a tangle of regimes, institutions, jurisdictions, prerogatives, powers, immunities, 
norms, labels, rankings, standards, privileges, doctrines, concepts, etc. Always a 
jungle, and always chaotic, but of a second nature, an urban jungle. Global Law 
as a worldwide legal Metropolis.14 Global Law is thus post-State, not because 
States would have disappeared or would not have had any use (they have not dis-
appeared and they are still useful), but because it is the legal environment within 
which States now operate. State sovereignty is no longer the unbridled freedom 
in the state of nature, but a more relative and constrained kind of freedom. States 
now must interact with other entities (state or not) in the tangle of complex legal 
 12. “Everybody in Global Law can claim themselves legislators. But this is not all. Some can estab-
lish themselves as “watchdogs” of globalization, as long as they be in possession of an effective 
means of controlling the actions of others. Or, since it is often what happens in practice, those 
in a situation of control can be required by others, often against their will, to carry the burden of 
watching, and if the case warrants it, sanctioning the bad behavior of other agents. This mission 
will often be designated “responsibility,” but the word holds a different meaning than when 
the word is used for moral responsibility, legal responsibility, or accountability.” See Benôit 
Frydman, “Comment penser le droit global?” in Jean-Yves Chérot & Benôit Frydman, eds, La 
science du droit dans la globalisation (Brussels: Bruylant, 2012) 17.
 13. See H Muir-Watt, “Private International Law Beyond the Schism” (2011) 2-3 Tranat’l Legal 
Theory 347.
 14. See François Schuiten & Benoît Peeters, Les cités obscures (Paris: Casterman, 1983). 
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relations that they now inhabit. It is not that state savagery is now unthinkable, 
or improbable (far from it), but its stage is now relatively more urban. 
 It should be noted that these remarks are not meant to remove the ambiguities 
present in the term “Global Law”. To the contrary, they are meant to conserve 
them. Global Law is tied to the deployment of globalized capitalism as it is with 
the putting into the perspective of state sovereignty. But it does not lend itself to 
being easily reduced or being assigned a historical or political definition that is 
simple and unambiguous. This is also the reason why I love the term. It evokes 
every projection and simplification imaginable, yet it connotes a number of phe-
nomena that turn out to be far more obscure and complicated than we could 
believe. 
The Global Turn in Legal Thought 
Now we come back to the first idea. We can do Administrative Law by concen-
trating on the study of the French legal order (domestic Law), we can mirror 
multiple national legal orders (classical Comparative Law), or can look to render 
an account of everything that is left to be subsumed under the term worldwide. 
Same objects, same theories, different scale: in its first meaning, all the legal 
theories, even stato-centrist ones, that cover the worldwide legal phenomena 
can be considered as global. Indeed, this change of scale does not in and of 
itself condemn the famous “Westphalian Duo” (dixit Twining) of the domestic 
legal orders and International inter-state Law pairing. This structure was already 
global, thanks to the universality of the legal forms that it would offer, and also 
because of its worldwide success. The first waves of globalization of Western le-
gal thought had diffused it to the ends of the earth throughout the 19th century.15 
Numerous jurists have since interpreted worldwide legal phenomena through the 
prism of this structure. One is never obliged to flip over into the post. 
 The term “global” might designate, however, other things than a simple change 
of scale. Rather, it could be that the change of scale also creates a change in the 
object. If we agree that Global Law is not an independent, universal Law which 
is separate from the diverse sub-global levels and transversal flows, but rather the 
interaction of these levels and flows, then the change of scale leads us to think of 
these legal spaces as existing in their ensemble as well as their possible means 
of articulation. It is not that the articulation of legal regimes at different levels is 
something unknown to domestic legal orders (far from it), but the problems that 
generally arise find their solution in the unity guaranteed by the State, a solution 
that is by definition lacking in the worldwide Metropolis. The change in scale is 
thus an invitation to change the object. One could decline this invitation, but it is 
no surprise that a number of legal scholars make the choice to accept it.
 15. Perhaps the paradoxical success of this conception having a worldwide destiny is what permits 
the States to be a part of the History of the World without losing their independence. The idea 
is suggested by Duncan Kennedy, “Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 1850-
2000” in David Trubek & Alvaro Santos, eds, The New Law and Economic Development, A 
Critical Appraisal (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) at 19. 
08_Xifaras_29.indd   222 1/16/16   1:36 PM
of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2016.8
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. Fondation nationale des sciences politiques, on 03 Mar 2017 at 09:37:08, subject to the Cambridge Core terms
The Global Turn in Legal Theory 223
 It may also happen that in changing the object, we need new tools. We may 
come to the conclusion that Comparative Law, as long as its task is primari-
ly comparing institutions of different national legal orders, is not adequate for 
studying transnational circulations. The change of the object can thus promote 
something like a change in theoretical perspective. It can create—as suggested 
by Benoit Frydman—a new paradigm. We might then have to speak of a Global 
Turn as we have spoken of a Linguistic Turn in philosophy.
 None of this is surprising. If Global Law—to repeat—is the tangle of legal 
relations between sub-global levels and transversal and regional flows relating 
to heterogeneous legal entities on a worldwide scale, and if this tangle became 
dense enough to constitute in itself a new ecosystem, it is hard to imagine how 
academic legal communities themselves (those networks of academic and re-
search institutions that are in charge of thinking about Law) could not belong to 
this ecosystem. If this is indeed the case, one can bet that the empirical condi-
tions of observation and of theorizing about Global Law have themselves been 
affected, and we must accept all the epistemological consequences that come 
with that. However, to adopt a “global perspective” on Global Law does not 
imply solely changing the scale or the object. It means as well adopting the epis-
temological perspective of Global Law when talking about the Law globally. The 
theories relating to worldwide legal phenomena that have adopted this point of 
view may be labeled Global Theories of Global Law (GTGL). 
 The number of legal scholars who have taken this Global Turn in the last 
century is now large. There is nothing surprising here. It is merely a chicken or 
egg problem between the emergence of an object and the conceptual frameworks 
that enable its conception, or between the emergence of a legal phenomenon 
and an academic community that thinks it up. We should thus not be surprised 
that the emergence of the supra- and trans-national organizations are tied to 
the academic communities who are themselves supra- and trans-national, whose 
members no longer perceive themselves as representatives of their national com-
munity of scholars, but as belonging to an emerging community of jurists that 
have adopted a “global perspective”. It is not surprising then that next to these 
“Global Lawyers”, who practice a wide range of legal work on the global scale, 
we find “Global Professors”, whose diverse range of educational, institutional 
and academic work is in line with the after of the turn. 
Second Idea: A Rough Geography of the Global Turn 
To take the Global Turn is to adopt a global epistemological perspective on global 
legal objects on a global scale. This epistemological perspective produces legal 
theories through academic communities, institutions, and networks of experts 
and legal scholars that are themselves globalized. The first academic communi-
ties and networks of global legal scholars emerged in national academic commu-
nities before the post. Some of these communities, or more often some sections 
of these communities, have concerned themselves with scientific activity that has 
led them, for diverse reasons, to take this turn. Academic networks of trans- and 
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supra-national, which were at times entirely deterritorialized, grew. Universities, 
journals, research institutes, educational programs now define themselves ex-
plicitly in terms of the “Global”. The new academic communities are in the pro-
cess of moving toward the scholarly side of the worldwide Metropolis. 
 These new communities might have started growing inside those national aca-
demic communities that perceived themselves as on the periphery and as domi-
nated in Westphalia. If this were the case, these communities would have much 
to win and little to lose by playing the “Global” against the national and regional 
powers that were occupying a central place in the world of the before. Moreover, 
it is quite possible that scholarly and academic communities of the United States 
had very early on bet on the “global sphere” so as to have developed the reason-
able hope of being in the center of it.16 One should also note that middle legal 
powers—especially those that used to understand themselves as central—are 
perhaps those that were the last to understand the novelty and the importance 
of the transformations that were occurring. Perhaps they had already paid a high 
price for the harmless nostalgia of their dead hegemonies. 
 The global academic communities recruit their members in national academ-
ic communities, generally on the fringes, particularly from the side of those 
who are concerned with supra- and trans-national phenomena in the world 
of before. This includes the internationalists and the comparatists of course, 
often theorists, but also specialists in domains that are very much globalized 
such as Arbitration, Economic Law, Human Rights, Law and Development, 
Environmental Law, etc. 
 These communities likely started by experiencing the intoxicating solitude of 
the avant-gardes. They are now situated at the center of the production and of 
the expansion of intellectual and cultural space that constitutes GTGL, while the 
national academic communities who did not take the Global Turn, or who took it 
less profoundly, or more slowly, are now “importers” of GTGL that they did not 
produce (or little).17
 The result is that the worldwide Metropolis is itself composed of centers (and 
of a Conference of centers), of peripheries and semi-peripheries. (The result 
is also that national communities are now divided into central and peripheral 
fractions, from the perspective of the worldwide Metropolis.) This new collec-
tion of flows in the world of legal thought does not have much to do with the 
Westphalian landscape. The National University of Singapore and other deter-
ritorialized research institutes that were yesterday unknown are no doubt very 
central today. Previously illustrious establishments and scholarly societies in 
Japan and France are now, from the perspective of the worldwide Metropolis, 
obscure and far in the periphery. 
 16. For example see Martin Shapiro, “The Globalization of Law” (1993) 1 Ind J Global Legal Stud 
37. See also Richard B Stewart, “US Administrative Law: a Model for Global Administrative 
Law?” (2005) 68:3 Law & Contemp Prob 63.
 17. It occurs sometimes that these “importing” communities perceive the GTGL as products that 
are “foreign” to cultural tradition and experience violence from this importation, which is 
under certain aspects analogous to the violence resulting from the forced cultural integration 
of non-Western historical worlds into western legalism. 
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 Like each time a new paradigm appears in a given domain of science, the 
Global Turn is a change that one can take or not, and that one can take to vary-
ing degrees. Thus, whatever place a national community of scholars occupies 
in the new hierarchy that organizes the worldwide Metropolis, even the more 
“peripheral” now find themselves directly or indirectly affected by globalization 
of Law and legal thought. The academic jurists, whether situated at the center or 
at the fringes of their community, whether massively exposed to incontestably 
supra- or trans-national phenomena, whether specialized into branches of their 
national legal order which are reputed to be more “internal” than others, now 
all find themselves with the obligation of taking into account the emergence of 
Global Law. And as the transformations do not occur without transformations 
in legal thought, they all find themselves confronted with GTGL, constrained to 
think something of it, and must face the possibility, at least in an abstract manner, 
of themselves taking the Global Turn.
 The result is that all the scholarly jurists, be they national or global, central 
or marginal (in the worldwide Metropolis), must negotiate for themselves, their 
work and their teachings, the place that the global perspective will occupy. They 
must also negotiate the way in which they will articulate (or not) this perspective 
when they address the national (or regional or infra-national) arenas to which 
they still belong, both concerning the definition of their object and concerning 
the epistemic view that they will adopt.18 There exists an infinite number of ways 
to negotiate this articulation: somewhere between those who have completely 
and utterly engaged themselves in the Global Turn and those who refuse to take 
this possibility seriously. Of course, in the beginning of legal globalization, this 
refusal could assume the significance of a political preference in favor of the 
“World of before the post,” something like the reasonable choice for remaining 
in Westphalia. But the continuing and (it would seem) irreversible development 
of Global Law, its impact still very much affecting domestic Law, has progres-
sively caused any such refusal to have lost pertinence and replaced it with the 
appearance of denial.
 To take the Global Turn boils down to exercising its professions of knowl-
edge and teaching in a passably different way. First of all, and for some time 
still (but perhaps for not that long of a time) we address students and colleagues 
in English who did not have at all the same legal education, who did not neces-
sarily experience the same joys upon reading the cryptic lines of precious judg-
ments handed down from the Conseil d’Etat, who did not necessarily read the 
same books, who did not necessarily reason in the same way and who did not 
necessarily even have the same practical preoccupations. National regulation 
of public markets or rules of expropriation does interest actors who are dealing 
with public markets or proprietors who could be expropriated, but also jurists 
who are trying to construct a body of coherent Administrative Law in order 
to legally constitute the national State as understood as an administrative ap-
paratus. But in global arenas, the questions concerning the Administrative Law 
 18. See Twining, supra note 1.
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of “my country” are only, in and of themselves, of very limited interest. They 
only make up something like one in 200 of the regulations existing in matters 
of public markets or of expropriation (if indeed there are 200 such States en-
dowed with such regulations in the world, which depends on how one counts 
States in federalized systems). The result is not that, from the perspective of the 
GTGL, the study of such objects inevitably loses all meaning. It is simply that 
this meaning cannot a priori be assumed, and the question asked to the academ-
ic jurists who take the Global Turn is how to make these theories interesting. 
Doing legal science in such a context leads us to seriously wonder what would 
be likely to interest colleagues who populate the diverse global academic com-
munities. (The effort required for this could prove to be immense, if we actually 
think that in order to understand what interests someone, it is preferable to actu-
ally know this person well.) 
 This question is made even more difficult by the fact that “Global Professors” 
do not operate (at least not all) in the supposedly homogenous sphere of a uni-
versal legal culture, for the simple reason that this culture probably does not 
exist. If we say that this Global Law is not global in the sense that it is universal, 
but rather because it employs, on a worldwide scale, a complex fabric of legal 
relations articulating various levels and flows, then global legal thought is not a 
homogenous conceptual legal space that is independent of traditions, cultures, 
and national contexts. The global journals, universities, and institutes, even the 
most deterritorialized, stem from one of several national or regional legal cul-
tures that determine in large part the perspective that they adopt on Global Law. 
Even if, when they take the Global Turn, the global jurists generally subject 
their legal education and their careers to academic communities that are still 
national (or regional, etc.). Thus, one does not cease to be French, Indian, or 
Chinese when becoming a “Global Professor”. To put it another way, it could be 
that the intellectual space that constructs the GTGL is deeply fragmented, that 
below the objects of study and the flows of common circulation, the dominant 
place of the “historical worlds”19 of before the post are strongly felt. It could be 
that these worlds leave their mark on institutions, rules, and legal concepts that 
come from western legalism, going so far as to create, from within the worldwide 
Metropolis, brand new hybrid legal cultures. 
 There will be varying extents to which legal scholars who took the Global 
Turn will no longer experience (or experience more) the feeling of belonging 
to their national legal community. These scholars remain largely dependent on 
the context and the tradition of their legal culture of origin, but cannot anymore 
act as if they were their official representatives in the new communities that 
welcome them. They became the French, Indian or Chinese Global Professors 
of ascendance. The arenas of Global Law are populated with recent immigrants, 
who share the condition and the problems of any recent immigrant, especially 
the problem of having to negotiate the departure of their own legal commu-
nity. They must simultaneously belong to their own community and the one of 
 19. The expression is Fernand Braudel’s.
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Global Law. This is why becoming a Global Professor often leads the individual 
to adopt multiple professional identities, it often brings out new forms of le-
gal multilingualism and it promotes tricky linguistic and conceptual translation 
problems in the academic exchange between scholars, both at the intersection 
of national and global arenas and within the last ones. 
 It should be noted that, at times, all this is a little less true for professors who 
are offered the possibility of believing that they are Global Professors because 
they travel a lot, even though they are content with carrying their unchanged 
perspective of their national legal community around the world. It seems to me, 
though I could be wrong, that this luxury is only available to professors in cer-
tain prestigious American and European institutions, and still carries a large risk 
of being exposed to ridicule. But just as in the matter of the Global Turn, it 
is still a question of more or less. Since we never truly escape ourselves, our 
education, and our initial experiences, it would be pointless to try and elaborate 
objective criteria that would definitively discriminate the various authentically 
global theories from those that simply project on global objects those concep-
tual paradigms and modes of reasoning that are too anchored to their national 
experience of origin to really separate them. In this grey zone, everything is a 
matter of nuances (more or less) and ambiguities (this from this perspective, that 
from that perspective), the GTGL lies everywhere (at times in a contradictory 
manner) between the recent adoption of an authentically global perspective and 
the remaining more or less unthought-of national perspectives that are analyzed 
on a worldwide scale. For example, one can interpret the promotion of “Global 
Constitutionalism” or “Societal Constitutionalism” either as a definitive rupture 
with the Westphalian model, in which the only constitution was that of the State, 
or to the contrary as the renewal of the idea (one very anchored in the national 
history of Western powers) that “constitutionalization” is inevitably the best re-
sponse to all our legal and political problems. This promotion could also be un-
derstood as the worldwide projection of the European experience of EU Law. In 
the same vein, Bruce Ackerman described “his” global turn in these terms: “If 
anything, American practice and theory have moved in the direction of emphatic 
provincialism. (…). We must learn to look upon the American experience as a 
special case, not as the paradigmatic case. (…) I have tried to be faithful to this 
precept in the speculations that follow. Rather than ruminate upon two centuries 
of American history, I have fixed by eyes firmly on the last half-century of world 
history and have allowed the American story to enter only as a source of supple-
mentary insight”;20 one could not have better expressed the act of exiting from 
a perspective that is strictly national for thinking about global phenomena, but 
all the same, this “World History” from where the author is currently speaking, 
whose history is it? (Or: Is the Global Turn about decentering one’s perspec-
tive or just about expanding it?) If the distribution of “authentic globalness” 
is obviously a futile venture, some GTGL do sound, both in form and content, 
particularly less global than others. However, it is very likely that “globalness” is 
 20. See Bruce Ackerman, “The Rise of World Constitutionalism” (1997) 83 Va L Rev 771.
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a contested quality that is not innate, but gets lost or conserved in the fierceness 
and the pertinence of scientific disputes.21
 Whatever the case, the Global Turn is now a theoretical possibility that offers 
itself to everybody. We can take it or not, take it more or less firmly, with more or 
less success, but what is really new, and what changes just about everything, is 
that we can no longer seriously deny the possibility of taking it. I am now going 
to specify the contours of this by developing the following three intuitions: When 
moving from Westphalian Legal Theories (WLT) of Global Law to the Global 
Theories of Global Law (GTGL), we are not talking about the same things (1), 
the aesthetics of the theories are no longer the same (2), and neither are the 
modes of reasoning (3). 
First Intuition. What are the GTGL All About? 
Foundations, Constructions, Limits
The WLT had the ambition of contributing to the building of the National State 
by rationalizing and legitimizing the national legal systems. 
 The legitimizing dimension involves the establishment of “foundations” of 
the State; in other words, it consists of discovering and delimiting the “funda-
mental principles”. The candidates are well known (the conscience of the people, 
the power of the sovereign, general will, political liberty, public service, etc.). 
We also know very well that the weariness of pulling from this list speaks to the 
exhausting nature of the question. 
 Because they claim a global perspective on Global Law, the GTGL concern 
themselves rather little with foundations, constructions, and limitations, but in-
stead, for reasons that I will come back to, with the beginnings and the effects 
attributable to the existence of legal institutions and regimes that they understand 
as new. In the Global Turn we become interested in the new, in what is happen-
ing, e.g., in what is emerging and in what is circulating. 
What is Emerging 
Global Law presents itself as an ensemble of new and surprising phenomena 
that come to derail the certitudes, the established conceptions, and the domi-
nant theories. In the world of the post, there is Law without State, International 
Public Law outside of the State, Constitutions without States, Law without 
sanctions, perhaps even Law without rules of Law, even Law without jurists 
(at least in a certain acceptance of the term). The distinctions between domestic 
Law and International Law or Public Law and Private Law have lost a lot of 
their pertinence. Global Law thus presents itself a little like the real according 
to Lacan, where our capacity for symbolization is overloaded from not entering 
 21. Moreover, it found itself a reflecting friend to decide, with excellent supporting reasons that the 
present article was, in certain ways, typical of state-centrism within the French legal doctrine. 
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into the classically admitted categories and divisions. This is why what is truly 
global about Global Law is that it manifests itself through its emergence. This 
is why, for the past several decades, the GTGL have continuously—in order 
to be constituted as global theories—justified the irreducibility of their ob-
jects to Westphalian conceptual frameworks, thus highlighting the importance 
of what emerges by overloading them: is it that the UN Charter is actually a 
Constitution? Were Nike’s public declarations really legally binding? Is Lex 
Mercatoria actually Law? What of the ratings provided by credit rating agen-
cies or the criteria for ranking universities? Are the international framework 
agreements really a new way to promote International Labor Law? The GTGL 
spend a lot of energy responding to these types of question. Since Savigny, we 
have known that in order to understand the essence (or the “legal nature”) of 
legal institutions, we must go back to their origins (which are often, but not 
always, Roman) in order to discover their fundamental constitutive principles. 
These were the principles that would allow these institutions to be observed in 
their initial state, which could in turn be used to interpret their evolution, much 
like the organic development of the original life form whose essential char-
acteristic was precisely to conserve the same principles by reproducing them. 
This is why, on the side of Comparative Law, Legal History has always been the 
quintessential auxiliary knowledge to WLT. 
 It seems that the tracking and the studying of the emergence of legal phe-
nomena belong to a genre that is passably different, one that goes back to what 
Foucault, a reader of Nietzsche, would call a Genealogy of the Contemporary: 
it is no longer really about the Monumental History, and the origin no longer 
provides a foundation. In the genealogical project, we no longer look to retrace 
the continuity of a legal institution, from its birth to the present, in the goal of 
establishing the identity and continuity of this institution’s essence within the 
various steps of its evolution. Rather, we look to highlight the discontinuities, the 
bifurcations, and the contingency of encounters from where new lines stem, and 
subsequently, to constitute what is emerging as events. 
 Events which emerged by overloading our conceptual frameworks (if this 
expression makes sense) are not necessarily new. The former, the specter, the 
permanent, and the perpetual that have been hidden until now also present 
themselves as something emerging. But because the global legal phenomena 
are emerging (regardless of whether they are former or new), they appear as un-
precedented, incomprehensible, and shocking to those who observe them. For 
those who wish it, it will always be possible to reintegrate these events within 
the frame of a Monumental History, such as the Grands Récits of liberalism’s 
triumph, of the expansion of capitalism, of the improvement of democracy, or 
the universalization of human rights. But those who are inclined to understand 
that which is emerging as events will find themselves better able to make sense 
of the contingencies, discontinuities and temporal bifurcations that genealogists 
deal with. This is why the genealogical approach, which is today claimed only 
by a small number of historians on legal globalization, could have its entire 
future ahead of it.
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 In the Monumental History, as in the genealogic way, the starting point is 
the present in which the event occurs. We understand it by retracing it to its 
beginnings. But while the quest for origins claims to describe a single and nec-
essary historical process that would tell us what is real and true of the origin, 
genealogy is used to make the past contemporary by understanding the present 
as the convergence point of a plurality of possible processes which become 
narratives only through the pen of the genealogist. This way of reporting the 
past as contemporary brings into memory philosophical stories that were the 
academic currency in the very first hours of globalization, in the second half 
of the 18th century, before history became the discipline as we now know. 
These stories were philosophical in the vein of French philosophes such as 
Montesquieu, Raynal or Diderot,22 works that were written against the uni-
versal Histories of the World penned by theologians. They did not claim to 
describe linear causalities, made heavy appeals to the exempla and to the topoi, 
and to take a thought from Paul Veyne, they thought that to explain more was to 
tell better.23 The GTGL already have a rich repertoire of exemplary cases (Nike, 
Pinochet, Union Carbide, Yahoo!, Chevron, Trafigura, Kiobel …) and topoi, 
and they present histories of legal globalization that are neither the History of 
the World nor the History of Humanity. Instead, they are the edifying account 
of significant and interesting legal relations that maintain between themselves 
various powers and forces on the global scale. This is only an intuition, but 
the approximation is tempting: if the GTGL had to have their own regime of 
historicity, it might be this one.
What is Circulating
Global Law is the product of increased circulation of concepts, techniques, argu-
ments, rules, and methods, as well as jurists themselves. To study a legal phe-
nomenon is not necessarily to dig deeply by going toward its base or its past; 
rather, it is to study its shifts at the surface level, to retrace the trajectories, the 
exchanges, the borrowings, the transplants. One of the dimensions that is pre-
ferred by GTGL might be the examination of the terms and conditions of diffu-
sion and reception for such and such legal object and the problems of translation 
pertaining to it.
 From this, one could map routes and circulation paths as well as the rep-
ertoire of misunderstandings and betrayals that occur in the ordinary course 
of such a voyage. A cartographic knowledge of movements on the surface, of 
horizontal and transnational flows and circulations. Some call it Transnational 
Genealogies.24 
 22. See Kenta Ohji, “Civilisation et Naissance de l’Histoire Mondiale Dans l’Historie des Deux 
Indes de Raynal” (2008) 129:1 Revue de Synthèse 57.
 23. Paul Veyne, Comment On Ecrit l’Histoire (Paris: Seuil, 1971) at 111. 
 24. See Duncan Kennedy, “A Transnational Genealogy of Proportionality in Private Law” in 
Roger Brownsword, Hans-W Micklitz, Leone Niglia & Stephen Weatherill, The Foundations 
of European Private Law (Oxford: Hart, 2011) 185.
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 All this can be interpreted as geography’s revenge on history. We can ask 
ourselves if Global Law is not what comes after history, not in the sense that 
something could no longer happen (the end of time), neither in the sense of a 
conclusion of a historical constitution process of Humanity as the Subject of 
History, but perhaps in the sense of the exhaustion of the belief in the truth of 
this process, and more certainly, of the truth of the accounts provided by the 
historians of World History. “Legal History” could lose its ordinary disciplines 
that provide the traits by which we know it today. Legal science could then lose 
some of the most familiar versions of its favorite “auxiliary science”. It could 
then enlist the services of conceptual and dynamic geography for the circulation 
of rules, concepts, and modes of reasoning that circulate throughout the globe. 
Intuition 2. The Aesthetics of Global Theories of Global Law
It should be understood that what first and foremost distinguishes WLT from 
GTGL is a matter of style. It is customary with jurists not to place much impor-
tance on questions of aesthetic value. They could prove to be important enough, 
however, to warrant some attention. In order to develop this second intuition I 
am going to lean entirely on a magnificent article by Pierre Schlag entitled The 
Aesthetics of Law.25
The Aesthetics of Law According to Pierre Schlag
Pierre Schlag uses the term “aesthetic” in a broad sense. It designates not only ar-
tistic activity, but also the sensible way of perceiving exterior objects. According 
to him, Law is an “aesthetic endeavor” in the sense that theories and legal dis-
course appeal to and promote a certain mode of sensible perception of the world 
and its objects. Without going into too much detail, his works are primarily con-
cerned with the theories and discourses of American Law, which is associated 
with four distinct aesthetics. 
 The first is a grid aesthetic in which Law is presented in a space of two dimen-
sions, divided by conjoining yet strictly delimited areas. This aesthetic has the 
constant burden of rigorously distinguishing legal regimes, acts, bodies, func-
tions, and to produce identifiable criteria for these distinctions, offering a repre-
sentation of Law drawn in with clear lines and well defined spaces. 
 The second is an energy aesthetic, associated with forces, their relations and 
conflicts, the movements, dynamics and flows that these relations and conflicts 
encourage. In this aesthetic, Law is marching, advancing and progressing. This 
march, these advances, this progress can be measured, quantified, and finally bal-
anced. Pierre Schlag associates this aesthetic with the schools born in the wake 
of the New Deal when the idea of a State perpetually on the move appeared. The 
energy aesthetic is about the management of permanent reform; it depends on the 
ability to quantify magnitudes.
 25. See Pierre Schlag, “The Aesthetics of American Law” (2001-2002) 115 Harv L Rev 1048. 
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 The third is the perspectivist aesthetic, which offers a representation of Law 
that varies with the situation of the observer. The perspectivist aesthetic declines 
to adopt the perspective of the omniscient narrator, assumes that legal theories are 
projects, permits their political character, recognizes their constructivist prem-
ises and embraces their skepticism. The pioneers of this aesthetic were Robert 
Hale and Charles Reich, but we find it especially developed by the feminist re-
construction and the identity approaches to Law, for which the Law is generally 
viewed from a given perspective. The perspectivist aesthetic is an aesthetic of 
relations, which are assumed to be stable (for example, in the feminist perspec-
tive: men are distinct from women, men still dominate women, and it would be 
best to remedy this through Law).26
 The fourth and the last is the dissociative aesthetic. This is a radicalization (or 
a dissemination) of the perspectivist aesthetic. Legal phenomena are no longer 
understood from a single perspective adopted by the academic jurist who observes 
them, but from the multiple perspectives that each of the observers of Law adopts 
respectively within a given legal consciousness, including the practitioners and 
the academic jurists who produce the theory. The multiplication of perspectives 
prohibits the adoption of a stable definition or even of a specific shape for legal 
phenomena. These phenomena are always both “this” and “that”, and sometimes 
“a little of this and little of that”. The dissociative aesthetic extends the skepti-
cism even to the position of the speaker of the theory, thereby preventing him 
from proposing a reconstruction of Law, even a partial one. This is an aesthetic of 
multiplicities and variations that proposes a fluid understanding of Law. It appears 
prominently in certain postmodern versions of Critical Legal Studies. 
The Aesthetics of Global Theories of Global Law
I now come to my second intuition. What follows presents itself as an aesthetic 
history of dominant legal theories in the United States during the last century 
(from formalism to realism, from realism to identity politics, from identity poli-
tics to post-modern versions of Critical Legal Studies). All this offers an exciting 
way of writing a History of American Legal Thought. This is however not the 
reason why I would like to make use of it. 
 It seems to me—although Schlag does not say it—that it is very possible 
to interpret these four aesthetics as two pairs that create a structure. The en-
ergy aesthetic, because it is an aesthetic of movement, of changing borders, 
and of overlapping divisions, presents itself as the internal critique of the grid 
aesthetic. The dissociative aesthetic is very explicitly the radicalization of the 
perspectivist aesthetic. The first pair is that of the static and the dynamic (A-B), 
the second pair that of totality and multiplicity (C-D). Inside these pairs, there 
is conflict. The second member of each (B and D) is respectively the critic of 
the first member (A and C). Thus in the first couple, viz., ‘grid/energy’, B is the 
 26. For more on this minimal definition of legal feminism, see Janet Halley, Split Decisions: How 
and Why to Take a Break from Feminism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008).
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internal critic of A; in the second couple, viz., ‘perspectivist/dissociative’, D is 
the internal critic of C. Each critical term (B and D) presupposes the relative 
hegemony of its target (A and C). 
 My intuition is that the aesthetic of WLT is more a part of the first couple 
(grid/energy) and the aesthetic of the GTGL is more a part of the second (per-
spectivist/dissociative). As such, the upheaval in the post would mark a change 
of aesthetic. 
 When we place the scientific approach in the fixed framework of a national 
academic community, we do not have to ask ourselves from where we are speak-
ing and to whom. This is because we may claim to speak in the name of the 
universality of science and of the rationality of the State. It is because we are 
talking to people who are accustomed to speaking among themselves, who speak 
more or less the same language, learned from frequenting the same libraries, and 
inclined to think that this way of speaking is the only existing way to speak, or 
the only way available, or at the very least, the best way.
 In the worldwide Metropolis, things go completely different. Here, it is 
about Global Professors who have in common the fact of having to negotiate 
their (at least partial) departure from their legal communities of origin, of hav-
ing to all be fresh-off-the-boat immigrants who still carry marks of their heri-
tage. This common experience does not provide a single cultural base, since 
the meaning and the manner of negotiating the relation with their community 
of origin varies considerably depending on which community of origin we are 
talking about, and depending on the distance that the individual has managed 
to take. There are as many ways to become a Global Professor as there are 
ways for diffusing the various versions of Western legalism and their reception 
within unique cultures and unique historical contexts. The recognition of this 
multiplicity of experiences feeds the perspectivist aesthetic (and its internal 
critique, the dissociative aesthetic). 
 It is true that the worldwide Metropolis certainly has a center (or a Conference 
of centers), peripheries, and semi-peripheries. It is true that the more we are situ-
ated at the center of this Metropolis, the more we are inclined to forget our own 
situation and to observe it through the third person, as if we could abstract our-
selves from it. The more we find ourselves at the center (or at one of the centers) 
of the worldwide Metropolis, the more Global Law appears in the shape of a 
uniform and universal Law, indifferent to the conditions and the context of its pro-
duction, a sphere without borders (or edges). In the era of the post, ethnocentrism 
has not disappeared. It has been transformed into something like global-centrism 
that faithfully repeats its shape and blindness. Before the post, theoretical ethno-
centrism had to make a considerable effort to hide what could have suggested the 
existence and the value of ‘other’ symbolic universes and modes of thought. In 
the post, global-centrism spends even more energy trying to forget that the global 
sphere is fragmented, crisscrossed by borders and fault lines to the point of not 
even being a sphere. And because these borders and fault lines are stubborn, the 
perspectivist aesthetic and its dissociative critique are ideal candidates for provid-
ing the dominant aesthetics of the GTGL, even at the center. 
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Intuition 3. The Rationalities of Global Law 
The View from Afar 
Because the GTGL looks to worldwide legal phenomena, its objects can only 
be viewed from afar. When the WLT is attached to the precise and meticulous 
construction of legal doctrines that would be comprehensive enough to provide 
a detailed account of a given domestic legal order, the GTGL have a tendency to 
bring up things “in bulk”, with a degree of generality that often leaves little place 
for technical subtleties. It is understandable why it is this way. Seen from China, 
Duguit looks more like Hauriou than when seen from Toulouse or from Bordeaux. 
Seen from Sudan, the composition of the French Constitutional Council does not 
differ all that much from the composition of the American Supreme Court. We 
discover the similarities when we view from afar, but we lose sophistication and 
precision. It is the reign of the great syntheses and strategic shortcuts.
 Completeness is also lost. When a study on the precedent and doctrine of expro-
priation according to the French Conseil d’Etat is conducted, one can still hope to 
propose to readers a comprehensive bibliography and an exhaustive list of perti-
nent decisions. But when working on Global Administrative Law of expropriation, 
the fact that one does not read Chinese or Japanese prohibits one from accessing 
a pile of Japanese or Chinese studies and cases that are directly tied to the subject. 
The mass of texts and linguistic obstacles has transformed the ideal of exhaustive-
ness into an inaccessible dream or into a neurotic symptom. One can regret this, 
and think that it is the triumph of vagueness, journalism, and weak ideas. It is true 
that (we will come back to it) the privileged role of the legal technicalities in the 
world of theorization at work in the WLT has found itself weakened, and that legal 
technique is still largely seen as what constitutes the beauty and rigor of the legal 
theories in many different national academic communities. The upheaval in the 
world of the post would mean a weakening of the rigorousness and of the serious-
ness that is fitting of something being labeled as “Legal Thought”.
 We can however also consider that what is at stake in the Global Turn is 
less the disappearance of rigor and seriousness than their transformation. The 
GTGL produce the standards and criteria of their own new modes of reason-
ing. These are founded on strategic acuteness, originality of theses and clarity 
of synthesis, the power of perspective, the prolificacy of research perspectives, 
and the interest of the projects these perspectives allow. We will thus interpret 
the Global Turn as the emergence of new forms of rigorousness and serious-
ness in legal thought. 
 I don’t have the skills necessary to expound on the question of whether there 
exists a “legal logic”, whether this “legal logic” is particular to legal science 
or whether this is only the application of a universal logic to legal phenomena, 
and whether the idea of a “new” logic is a logical monster or not. I would like 
to suggest however, in this third part, that one doesn’t exactly reason and argue 
in the same way in the WLT as in the GTGL… I will merely throw out some 
cursory thoughts. 
08_Xifaras_29.indd   234 1/16/16   1:36 PM
of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2016.8
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. Fondation nationale des sciences politiques, on 03 Mar 2017 at 09:37:08, subject to the Cambridge Core terms
The Global Turn in Legal Theory 235
Normative Pluralism
Whether in the name of the autonomy of Law, of its autotelic and autopoietic 
character, or by invoking the hermeneutic circularity, we agree to understand 
Law as a system constituted by arguments that are only pertinent if they are 
recognized themselves as legal. We can certainly cite political considerations 
or values of justice, but they must be translated legally. In front of a judge, one 
does not expect from the parties to plead the superiority of their social status or 
the impoliteness of the opposing party. Only the legal has teeth.27 As a result, it 
is from the perspective of the internal view of Law that jurists define the separa-
tion between what is legal and what is not legal, through the recognition by the 
legal system of the “legality” of the jurisdiction, facts, rules, concepts or argu-
ments in a given case. This is why, during the time when the WLT of the State 
(the so-called “General Theories of the State”) wanted to be legal Theories, their 
ambition was to trace with extreme precision the border that separates the State 
understood as a system of legal norms from a State understood as a sociological 
or psychological phenomenon, or as a political power. To this end, these WLT 
have focused, in various ways, on reducing facts to strictly legal phenomena and 
to express them in a specifically legal form. This mode of theorizing implied 
three operations: firstly, reducing the chaos of life to several clearly identifiable 
types of objects (norms, of course, but also at times, depending on the adopted 
ontology, concepts, ideas, acts, bodies, etc.) and secondly, the formalizing of 
these legal objects, by using concepts that were recognized as having a legal 
meaning, then, thirdly, systematically classifying them within legally pertinent 
typologies. I am going way too fast, but I believe that one will understand more 
or less what I mean. 
 It seems to me that one of the characteristic traits of Global Law is to put 
forward phenomena that are legal in a certain sense, but cannot be correctly 
described (or a fortiori explained) in the framework of a strictly legal epistemol-
ogy (in the sense that this epistemology would be grounded on the reduction, 
formalization and classification that I just talked about). The code of conduct of 
a large multinational company is not real enforceable Law when it acts as a PR 
tool on a web site. It becomes enforceable Law when it is invoked before a judge 
that sees it as grounds for enforcing certain legal obligations. 
 Inspired by works of legal anthropology, some looked to render an account of 
these hybrids by talking about “legal pluralism”. The expression ordinarily desig-
nates the coexistence of positive norms (in the sense of State Law) and of non-pos-
itive norms, stemming from Living Law (Ehrlich) or from Social Law (Gurvitch). 
This pluralism here is classified as legal to the extent that these theories look to 
establish the recognition of the “legalness” of non-state rules, with the goal of con-
testing the reduction of Law to positive (State) Law. Still, even the most centralized 
national legal orders have always recognized the existence, within a legal system, 
 27. Karl N Llewellyn & E Adamson Hoebel, The Cheyenne Way: Conflict and Case Law in 
Primitive Jurisprudence (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1941) at 283.
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of rules of non-state origin (customs or professional practices for example). In 
practice, the State has never seriously claimed a strict monopoly on normative 
production, but rather that State Law prevails over Living (or Social) Law. In this 
sense, it could be that the pluralism of Global Law largely exceeds what we ordi-
narily understand by the expression “legal pluralism”. 
 Speaking about “Living” or “Social” Law is a way to expand the sphere of the 
legal to the rules produced by non-State institutions but also to understand these 
rules as a kind of latent Law waiting for recognition by State-Law. There is no 
“Living” or “Social” Law out of a context where the State prevails. Furthermore, 
it is very likely that the prevalence of State Law in a given social context explains 
how social norms can be understood through patterns of thought and categories 
that are homologous to those conveyed by State Law. Legal analysis seizes upon 
the rules of court settlement in matters of divorce and treats them as rules of Law 
in action because these settlements are produced under the shadow of the Law, that 
is to say, produced in an institutional context where the conflicts that arise from the 
failure of “Social Law” are worked out before a judge using clauses from positive 
Family Law. This pluralism is legal because the non-legal normative orders are 
strengthening and complementing the prevailing legal order which is modeling 
them. Rules of civility between neighbors or rules for bargaining between mar-
ried couples find themselves shaped into procedures, categories, and protocols of 
thinking that are under the purview of Law and legal thought. The notion of “legal 
pluralism” does not signal an exit from legalism, neither does it signal that legal-
ism is in danger, but rather, it signals the extension of its margins and the constitu-
tion of “the social” as the negative-image version of the Law. There is no “legal 
pluralism” outside the uncontested supremacy of the Law. This supremacy can 
either be understood as a universal feature of every human culture (“property is a 
universal institution, therefore the Cheyenne do have property rights, even if these 
rights are different from ‘ours’”) or as a jeux de mot, every prevailing normative 
order in a given context being labelled “Law” (“there are no property rights for 
the Cheyenne, but the way they are allocating things to each other can be called 
“Law” since it prevails within their society”). In both of these theoretical perspec-
tives, we lack the words for distinguishing within normative orders that prevail in 
“their” context, those that run on Western legalism and the others.28 This lack is a 
problem, since the key question to answer here is not if “their” prevailing norma-
tive order shall be labeled Law or not, but rather, now that western legalism has 
been exported everywhere, which normative order (may be non-legal) is providing 
the tools for articulating Western Law with what remains from the non-Western 
normative orders which were prevailing before the encounter. Despite the axioms 
on which “legal pluralism” is grounded, it may very well not be Western Law. 
 Because within the normative hybrids that populate Global Law the Law 
of western origin does not always prevail, it might not be capable of shaping 
non-legal normativities the way it does with quasi-legal orders in the West. To 
the contrary, the Law, its rules, procedures and categories might very well find 
 28. See Brian Tamanaha, “Understanding Legal Pluralism” (2008) 30 Sydney L Rev 375.
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themselves shaped by other normativities, whose mode of functioning is foreign 
to legalism. The modes of articulating non-legal orders with the Law might very 
well be themselves non-legal. 
 It is therefore possible that the pluralism of these hybrids is not primarily or 
centrally legal. It could thus be more pertinent to talk of “normative pluralism”. 
This would lead us to wonder if Law remains Law as long as it does not prevail, 
or if Global Law is even still Law, in the ordinary sense that this term is used. The 
term “normative pluralism” is a better fit to describe these situations of multilin-
gualism where the dominant normative language of a community is not necessar-
ily the language of the Law. Sometimes, from the violent encounter of legal and 
non-legal normative orders, new hybrids have emerged that are neither purely 
“legal or “non-legal” in the sense that the structural borrowing of building blocks 
coming from both has produced a new normative order which langue (or struc-
ture) can only be understood as the result of a process of creolization. The term 
“normative pluralism” is loose enough to cover these cases. 
Disciplinary Eclecticism
From the perspective of the WLT, none of this is very new, neither is it very 
interesting. Nobody has ever claimed to actually reduce the State to its Law. 
Many grant themselves the time and effort to study the other normativities that 
are at work. All the facts, acts, norms, and legal concepts that are tied to the ac-
tion of the State are, and have always been, legal from a certain point of view 
and not legal from other points of view. The administrative act through which 
the President appoints Dupont as the head of a state-owned agency is a legal act 
that involves theories of Public Law. However, it is also a psychological act (the 
president loves Dupont), a political act (Dupont is rightwing), a sociological act 
(Dupont and the president went to the same judo class when they were kids), etc. 
But specifically, what interests the legal theory of the State, is the legal aspect of 
what the president does. Similarly, nothing in the ontologically hybrid character 
of Global Law should prohibit us from trying to make a legal theory of Global 
Law. There is no reason to object to this. Global Law does not carry normative 
hybrids per se. Rather, the adoption of a global perspective on Global Law might 
weaken the need for promoting a specifically legal theory of Global Law, and 
strengthen the belief that being interested only in the purely legal dimension of 
the studied phenomena is reductive and formalistic. It might lead us to be no 
longer satisfied with this pure and narrow “legal” approach. 
 WLT mapped out legal knowledge as the juxtaposition of distinct yet com-
plementary scientific perspectives within the ensemble of social sciences (the 
sociologist teaches us that Dupont and the president did judo together, the politi-
cal scientist that Dupont is rightwing, the psychologist that the president loves 
Dupont, etc.). In this context, the work of the jurist is to produce the knowledge 
that specifically concerns the “legalness” of the phenomena being considered 
(Dupont is appointed by a decision made in the Council of Ministers, this deci-
sion is only valid if it is signed in such or such way, by such and such officials, 
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it can be contested under certain conditions, etc.). To the contrary, the Global 
Turn encourages the production of eclectic knowledge that strives to think of the 
various dimensions of the studied phenomena in their ensemble, relatively indif-
ferent to the disciplinary origin and the disciplinary coherence of the theoretical 
tools which are mobilized. 
 Academic communities that dedicated themselves to the production of WLT 
wanted to be communities of “jurists” and recognized each other as such. We 
certainly find a considerable number of academic jurists whose project is to con-
struct academic communities of jurists on the global scale. But this project can 
be interpreted as the simple reproduction on the global scale of that which pre-
ceded it on the national or regional scale. Other academics take the Global Turn 
more firmly and seek to adapt the nature of their knowledge to the objects that 
they are studying. The task is easier for those who did their studies in one or two 
(or three) given disciplines (not always Law), but acquired, in one way or an-
other, some knowledge of the Law. This provides points of interest when think-
ing of the future of legal education. These Global Professors are not particularly 
driven to attain the status of “jurists”, and do not claim to produce knowledge 
that is specifically “legal”. To tell the truth, they find the disciplinary distinctions 
boring. These distinctions belong a little too much to the world before the post. 
What is important for them is the pertinence and the seriousness with which the 
required theoretical tools are mobilized. When they speak of Foucault (and it 
does happen that they speak of him) what is important is not so much knowing 
what they are doing is really philosophy but that they have read enough of him 
so that when they talk about him, it remains interesting. When they carry out 
economic analysis, which happens even more often, it is enough, to their joy, not 
to be overly mistaken about the fundamental concepts of economics, to avoid 
errors in calculation, and choosing the wrong statistical models. And of course, 
when they study the legality of a phenomenon, which happens all the time, they 
carefully try to avoid confusing the legal texts that are in force, to characterize 
the facts in a credible way, using categories and legal reasoning in such a way 
that an observer only sees “Law”, etc.
 One could perhaps find this disciplinary eclecticism to be a regression from 
the perspective of trying to elaborate critical knowledge on Law. Through criti-
cism (according to Kant), knowledge takes charge of its own conditions of pos-
sibility and deduces from these conditions the ways in which the object studied 
can be constructed. In the criticist approach, the constitutive formalities of disci-
plinary knowledge determine the objects of this knowledge. Before the post, and 
particularly in the WLT that resorted to this criticism, legal science dealt with 
what could be known from the point of view of legal science. In the worldwide 
Metropolis, the objects are dictated by the issues of real life, in other words, by 
the way in which various communities of actors and experts understand and 
construct these issues, or even by the various endeavors and projects that these 
actors and experts pursue. These endeavors and projects are not all (far from it) 
“legal”. The question of the conditions of possibility of the knowledge they pro-
duce is rarely asked.
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 From the diversity of these communities of actors and experts, from the mul-
titude of endeavors and projects that emanate from these communities, emerge 
global legal phenomena that manifest themselves most often in shapes elaborat-
ed by other knowledge, other protocols of thinking, and other disciplinary proj-
ects than those carried out by academic jurists. All this was already largely true 
when legal science was practiced on a national scale, but the change of scale, the 
multiplication of actors, and the frightening complexity of issues and stakes that 
followed (how do we slow down global warming?) has, without a doubt, made it 
more difficult to believe in the preeminence of a single epistemic perspective for 
understanding and resolving global problems. Open competition between vari-
ous types of expertise and knowledge does promote a relativization of authority 
of scientific knowledge in general (to deal with the problem of hunger in the 
world, do we look to economists, agronomists, or climatologists? and is this re-
ally the question to ask?). Finally, perhaps the concrete conditions in which the 
world is globalizing have given the first word to those other than the jurists (but 
it is still a chicken and egg problem, the jurists come often after the merchants 
and the engineers, but one often needs some kind of Law in order for this kind 
of commerce and engineering to exist). Whatever the case, the global forum 
does not promote the isolierung of Law. Rather, it has the tendency to endorse 
epistemic perspectives that mix, without too much compunction, heterogeneous 
knowledge, which often includes a smattering of political points. The power/
knowledge is seen here in its raw state.29
From Whole to Fragments
In Global Law, and this is probably the most striking contrast with WLT, we can-
not anymore relay what the national institutions and bodies are doing to a single 
political unity—call it People, Nation, or Constituent Power. The subjects that 
manifest themselves are not necessarily less political but they took the shape of 
networks of actors and experts. The question of the relationship between Law 
and politics has thus been firmly changed. In the WLT, the political forces were 
located at the head of the State (the sovereign bodies) and at times at the base 
(the citizens). In this way, one can interpret the WLT as the (political) enterprise 
to subject the political (understood as the arbitrary nature of the Prince and some-
times of the Multitude) to legal (technical) rules and procedures. Essentially, this 
enterprise consisted of separating from actors and actions those who came under 
the domain of political and those who came under the domain of legal, the latter 
considered simply as technical and thus politically neutral, all while nevertheless 
 29. “There is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor 
any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations. 
These “power knowledge relations” are to be analyzed, therefore, not on the basis of a subject 
of knowledge who is or is not free in relation to the power system, but, on the contrary, the 
subject who knows, the objects to be known and the modalities of knowledge must be regarded 
as so many effects of these fundamental implications of power knowledge and their historical 
transformations.” Michel Foucault, “Discipline and Punish” in Julie Rivken & Michael Ryan, 
eds, Literary Theory: An Anthology, 2d ed (Malden: Blackwell, 2004) at 551.
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making legal actors and their actions the product of sovereign political entities. 
The political (the will or the power of sovereign bodies) was thus the source of 
Law but its operations were depoliticized through their submission to techni-
cal rules and procedures. These operations would thus be neutral. Legal actors 
(and their actions) could appear as passive agents for carrying out the will of the 
original sovereign subject, and in return for being stripped of their political at-
tributes (far more during the 20th century), would subject the sovereign to tech-
nical mechanisms, rules, and procedures of which they were the masters. I will 
not discuss here whether this endeavor was achieved in a way other than through 
theory, nor will I discuss whether it was actually achievable in the first place.
 From the perspective of the relations between Law and politics, Global Law 
appears as a mesh of regimes, systems, and institutions that are at times purely 
technical, at times explicitly political, and at times both. Market laws, informa-
tion systems, technical or accounting norms do not claim to manifest a political 
will or an arbitrary political nature that should be limited. Instead, they act as 
technical systems based on objective knowledge, politically neutral. This is likely 
the reason why some thought that legal globalization was “post-political”, in the 
sense that it would herald the triumph of experts and usher in the idea of political 
that we have known until today (sovereignty). This vision must be balanced by 
the consideration of other supra- and trans-national regimes, organizations, and 
legal systems that explicitly meant to achieve political projects. Environmental 
Law was first promoted by those who were looking to preserve the environment; 
International Human Rights Law was first promoted by those who made respect 
for human rights a political priority; development was first promoted by those 
who believed that they had the solutions to underdevelopment, etc. Other institu-
tions, organizations and systems are presented as technical in their functioning 
but political in their goals, as being technical is sometimes the best way to be 
politically efficient—we defend human rights better by presenting them as objec-
tive and neutral.
 Global Law thus presents itself as a legal mixture of the technical and the 
political that renders any attempt at their strict separation somewhat futile. It 
is easy to see their permanent tension at every level. Moving past the national 
framework does not signal the death of the political in Law, but rather its dis-
semination at each intersection, border, and fault line of the Metropolis. Politics 
is everywhere Law is done and thought of: in the ambivalences of each arbitrator, 
in the denial of each bureaucrat, in the ethic ambiguities of each expert. All this 
was perhaps not any less true at the national level or in the world of before the 
post, but it was much easier to simplify the issue by isolating the political at the 
head of the State (and sometimes at the base), which is all the more reason why 
we believed in it in the first place. 
 This dissemination is possibly the hint of a more profound mutation. The im-
possibility of attributing the origin of Global Law to a single subject makes it 
more difficult to think of it in terms of a whole (the only candidate would be 
Humanity itself, but Global Law does not look anything like a universal Law of 
Humanity). The WLT generally seeks to render an understanding of the national 
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legal system as an articulated, coherent and dynamic whole. These consider-
ations are prevalent in the conversation on Global Law, but it seems to me taking 
firmly the Global Turn might lead one to forget about these types of aspirations. 
This is not so much because the proposed material would be too heterogeneous, 
or too fragmented, or too variable, or too disseminated, but because the endeavor 
of totalizing had everything to do with the wish to unify the political community 
by the Law under the power of an originating Sovereign, which is lacking today. 
 It cannot be repeated enough: the worldwide Metropolis is not a sphere. 
Global Law looks more like fragments of something than a whole, and nothing 
indicates that it is destined to become one. The cosmopolitan project is only, in 
certain global arenas, one project among others. Its advocates often recruit in 
national or regional communities that fancy themselves to be Empires without 
always having considered the extent of heterogeneity that would be involved in 
achieving their vision. 
Essences, Forms, and Models 
The absence of a worldwide political community does not only prohibit the idea 
of a shared belonging to the same totality. It also indicates that the actors, ex-
perts, and scholars of Global Law do not share a common vision of the world. 
It may even indicate the absence of a mutual sharing of a sensible perception of 
what the world is that would make sure that we speak of the same thing within 
various global arenas. This pluralism goes well beyond the incredible diversity 
of opinions, values, projects, cultures, and theoretical approaches present, be-
cause it strikes radically against the notion of a common reality. It seems to me, 
that this is the human condition, but in Global Law, we can hardly discern an 
ontology that would be dominant enough to make us forget it. 
 In the absence of a shared vision of what scientific convictions could be, one 
may try to impose unilaterally its own, based on the sole assumption that these 
convictions are better than any other or—in a version even more pathetic yet 
more common—that they are universal and therefore meant to be universally 
shared, if enough time and force is given to convert those who are not convinced 
yet. (Think of the project of spreading worldwide the classical version of Law 
and Economics in the 90s, for example.) An alternative is to realize how much 
the heterogeneity of beliefs, ideologies, the various lifeworlds [Lebenswelt] and 
visions of the world [Weltanschauung] fragment the global arenas and therefore 
to try our best to find pragmatic ways to clumsily articulate propositions and 
projects that are at times heterogeneous, even to the point that they cannot be 
expressed in one language (about that Japanese colleague who is attending your 
conference on Constitutional Law: do you really know why he is here and what 
he thinks of it?).
 This is perhaps the reason why, with the Global Turn, modes of reasoning 
that we classify as pragmatic prosper as long as they appear to be less the search 
for the truth and more as a practical elaboration of acceptable solutions or as the 
promotion of political projects presumed legitimate. This bend helps substitute, 
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within legal reasoning, the measuring and the balancing of interests or distribu-
tional analysis for conceptual deductions and legal syllogisms. 
 It is also the reason why one would prefer models that assume their con-
structivist premises in the production of “general theories” whose claims are 
explicitly grounded on dogmatic conceptions of the legal truth. That is why 
it is likely that this very special kind of formalism ordinarily associated with 
legal dogmatics will decline. But this evolution does not signal a general de-
cline of formalism, because the models in question are able to obey very strict 
standards of formalization (think of Law and Economics, of various theories 
of decision, and of empirical studies). It also remains to be seen whether this 
evolution is the triumph of neo-formalism, because many GTGL are highly 
anti-formalistic, even sometimes explicitly irrationalist. 
 The flavor of pragmatism that pervades the Global Turn could promote the 
development of rights-oriented discourse (particularly on human rights, but of 
all subjective rights in general) because this discourse is very favorable to the 
expression of political and ideological aspirations, especially when these aspira-
tions are a part of projects that are concerned with the recognition of political 
identities—what we call identity politics. These discourses have experienced 
such a success in the global arena that one could think that the rights/identity 
couple is the distinctive marker of the legal grammar particular to the Global 
Turn. I do not know if the Global Turn allows the identification of any domi-
nant method or even grammar, which would be that of global legal thought in 
general. Rather, it seems to me that within the academic communities of Global 
Law, what is dominant is the eclecticism of methods and the diversity of legal 
languages (discourses on rights, but also the discourse of economic efficiency, of 
constitutionalization, of codification, etc.). The language of rights is one of these 
languages for sure, but never dominant enough to claim hegemony or resist in-
terpolations. These languages interweave, colonize, and overlap each other. They 
are all available for the actors and can be used at the same time within the same 
legal reasoning.
 The Global Turn seems less like a theory, a method or a given legal language, 
than like various ways to express methods, languages, and theories within the 
same mood or atmosphere, something which has been at times called a “legal 
consciousness”. 
Conclusion 
I have just presented three intuitions relating to what legal thought would be if it 
took the Global Turn. I do not know what they are worth, and cannot in any case 
claim that they are new. It seems to me that I can name dozens of colleagues who 
would gladly describe themselves as Global Professors. Surely what I discussed 
above is too intimately tied to the way in which I myself negotiate the tension 
between my belonging to a national academic community and global academic 
communities. Perhaps other ways of negotiating this tension would lead to other 
intuitions. One can thus also read the above as a testimony. 
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 Nevertheless, what emerges from these intuitions is a thesis. The time of the 
Westphalian Legal Theory is over, and a new way of theorizing about the State 
and its relations with its legal environment is emerging. Global Law refers to 
this new environment as well as the way in which it is conceived. This thesis 
is fragile. It could be false, or the reflection of a transitory moment. It could be 
that, through the last ruse of History, the historical meaning of Global Law’s 
emergence is to pave the way for the Universal and Homogenous State and with 
it, inevitably, the triumphant return of the Westphalian Legal Theory genre. This 
time, it would be applicable to what would be the Mega-Global State, the cosmo-
politan totality finally realized. As for me, I do not believe too much in History. 
This scenario seems plausible, but just as plausible as many other very different 
scenarios. But it also seems quite a bit less plausible than others because its 
realization flies in the face of projects and interests that appear very strong to 
me. It is true that there is nothing objectionable about a ruse of History, since it 
is a ruse. Let’s just say then that, for now, this hypothesis of the Universal and 
Homogenous State is not very useful. It does not allow us to think about the mesh 
of networks and flows, normative pluralism, or the fragmentation of lifeworlds 
[Lebenswelt] and visions of the world [Weltanschauung] within the worldwide 
Metropolis. Perhaps, one day, it will triumph. But this idea comes either too 
late or too early. Today, it is useless. After the WLT, comes the GTGL and not 
the GTMGS—General Theory of the Mega Global State. From now until the 
Universal and Homogenous State emerges from Global Law, we will have plenty 
of time to forget and then reinvent State-centered Westphalian Legal Theory, if 
ever the need arises.
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